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A Fire & Gas Detection System enables detection of a gas release or a fire scenario and raises 
alarms and/or initiates appropriate control action (system isolation, deluge, facility shutdown, etc.). 
This serves to minimize the potential for escalation of events that could lead to a catastrophic 
damage. To achieve this objective, the coverage of fire and gas detectors should be sufficient to 
detect gas leaks and fires and this should be set as a performance requirement. Risk assessments 
which take credit for successful detection of a release activating isolation and blowdown must be 
required to demonstrate the assumed performance can be achieved. Relying on conventional 
approaches based on experience and engineering judgement for developing fire and gas detector 
layout may not be sufficient. A 3D evaluation of the process unit helps to improve the coverage 
and demonstrate performance, taking into account detector specifications (technology, sensitivity, 
detection range, etc.), voting logic and reliability. 
 
This paper examines various aspects of fire and gas detection, identifying the gaps and 
inconsistencies that exist in the detector layout developed based on conventional approaches. 
Using case studies, the paper demonstrates the necessity to refine these approaches to ensure all 
hazard sources are covered sufficiently. Furthermore, this paper presents the benefits of adopting 
a 3D assessment for fire and gas detector coverage using appropriate software tools and the aspects 
to be considered when such 3D calculations are used to determine coverage. Using case studies, 
the paper demonstrates how such 3D techniques can optimize the number and location of detectors. 
It also presents a brief overview of how advanced modelling using Computational Fluid Dynamics 




The Fire & Gas Detection System (FGS) plays an important role in preventing escalation of 
gas leak or fire scenarios in both onshore and offshore oil and gas facilities. Similarly, early 
detection of toxic releases is also necessary for personnel protection. Ensuring the optimal 
reliability and performance of the FGS is therefore important. Successful detection helps limit the 
consequence footprint of hazardous events either through automatic action or through operator 
response to alarms. To achieve this objective, the detection coverage of fire and gas detectors 
should be adequate to cover the areas identified with hazard / potential. Also, the desired system 
performance has to be demonstrated based on the voting logic adopted by the facility (e.g. 1ooN 
for alarms, 2ooN for executive actions, etc.). 
 
The conventional approaches for developing detector layouts based on operating experience 
and rule-of-thumb practices may not ensure sufficient detection coverage and desired system 
performance. There exists a wide variation in the philosophies adopted for FGS implementation. 
This paper aims to identify the gaps and inconsistencies in traditional approaches for 
implementation of the FGS. It also aims to demonstrate how 3D Fire & Gas mapping software 
tools can be effective in optimizing the numbers and locations of fire and gas detectors to achieve 
optimal FGS performance and desired coverage. 
 
Linkage to Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) 
 
A high probability (typically 90%) of successful fire and gas detection is usually assumed in 
QRAs. This assumption, however, is normally not verified against the actual FGS performance 
and detection coverage achieved for the relevant areas. In reality, aspects such as provision of 
detectors only for limited equipment, practical limitations in terms of coverage achieved due to 
high degree of congestion etc. may tend to increase the gap between the assumptions on probability 
of successful detection in QRA and the actual achievable detector performance. Therefore, without 
a systematic verification process to ensure that the FGS performance can meet the assumptions 
used in the QRAs, the risks associated with a facility may be underestimated. Although there are 
some guidelines which require the effectiveness of detection and detector reliability to be assessed 
to ensure the residual risk is within acceptable limits [1], these are not uniformly adopted. Gaps in 
system performance may therefore continue to propagate from the design phase to the operational 
phase of facilities. This aspect is also further substantiated by historical data [2], which shows that 
only about 50% of the major leaks were actually detected by detectors. This number is significantly 
lower than the assumptions in QRA. This reinforces the necessity to refine the existing approaches 
to ensure FGS performance meets the required level. It also calls for deeper insight into the other 
relevant aspects of FGS design which are discussed in this paper. A risk based approach may 
eventually prove to be one of the best ways forward. 
 
Are all hazards covered? 
 
Prior to establishing the FGS performance, the design must determine which equipment 
require detection. This step forms the basis for the provision of detectors and hence, caution must 
be exercised to ensure that all hazard sources are identified. In the authors’ experience, this is an 
area where inconsistencies are observed. There are various philosophies adopted both in terms of 
locations of detectors and equipment to be protected, with some approaches resulting in minimal 
detection. 
 
The authors have seen similar facilities with significant differences in terms of provision of 
detectors owing only to differences in considerations. In some projects (especially onshore) only 
rotating equipment are provided with detection while others have considered all hydrocarbon 
handling equipment (rotating, static) as credible hazard sources. Even for rotating equipment, 
depending on capacity, composition, process parameters, etc., it is often the case that not all 
hydrocarbon handling rotating equipment are provided with detection. For example, pumps 
handling flammable materials other than LPG may not be protected with detectors although they 
handle hydrocarbon liquid at elevated temperatures or close to boiling point. 
 
A common assumption is that static equipment are not a credible leak source or have a low 
frequency for external releases. However, clusters of static equipment located in a congested layout 
or in a modular structure when considered along with their connections and instrumentation may 
result in a leak frequency as high as rotating equipment, if not higher. Without verifying the 
provision of detectors in such areas, credit for successful detection and subsequent isolation may 
also have been assumed in the QRA or Fire Risk Analysis (FRA) to reduce the risk associated with 
these equipment. Some references [3] do consider that a cluster of valves and flanges will 
constitute a hazardous area by themselves, but again these are not uniformly adopted. Another 
example observed in the many designs is to provide detectors for pumps / equipment handling 
liquid at auto-ignition temperature but no consideration applied for pumps handling liquid close to 
boiling point. Even in the upstream sector (i.e. fixed platforms, FPSOs), where a more stringent 
detection requirement is expected, often sufficient detection is not provided citing reasons such as 
higher maintenance costs, especially when reviewing the detection requirements for normally 
unmanned installations. 
 
In most cases highlighted above, no clear justification is provided for not providing detectors 
for all the hazard sources. To some extent, the reason for above inconsistencies is the lack of clear 
guidelines regarding which equipment should be protected. Each operating company or the design 
consultant is basing the detection requirements on their operation experience, engineering 
judgement and past practices. To ensure that all hazards are covered adequately, it is therefore 
necessary to develop a minimum standard to determine the requirements for detection for process 
equipment. The most effective way to undertake this exercise is to evaluate the nature of the 
hazards (jet fire, pool fire, flammable gas release, toxic gas release) associated with each 
equipment or cluster of equipment including valve assemblies in an area depending on the process 
stream composition and fluids (e.g. pressurized gas, heavy liquid, flashing liquid, liquefied gases, 
etc.) handled. This information can then be used to determine the type of detectors (fire and/or gas) 
required at an equipment or area level. For equipment handling toxic materials, concentration 
above IDLH [4] in the process stream can be an appropriate threshold for determining the 
requirements for detection. In addition to equipment, even areas with clusters of leak sources, such 
as PSV platforms or valve manifolds may need a thorough review to determine the requirement of 
detection. 
 
For instance, a pump handling LPG will require both fire and gas detection where as a pump 
handling Diesel or Kerosene may only require fire detection (unless operating at elevated 
temperature). Even while defining the area for protection (grading), consideration must be given 
to the process parameters and components. For example, will the release be buoyant or heavy, will 
it result in a pool fire or a jet fire or both, etc. Such considerations will enable the development of 
a sound basis for provision of detectors. Although the area (grading) considered for protection may 
vary based on the operating company, applicable guidelines, etc., it is essential to capture the 
hazards correctly to ensure that the effectiveness of the FGS will be enhanced. 
 
As an example, a sample geometry with typical processing equipment as shown in Figure 1 
was developed to demonstrate the considerations highlighted in this paper. Assuming the service 
conditions for the equipment as presented in Table 1, the requirements for detection have been 
summarized. Ideally, an appropriate justification should be provided for considering or not 
considering the provision of detectors for each equipment. 
 
 
Note: The sample geometry was generated using IRESC’s 
proprietary in-house 3D fire & gas mapping software tool. 
Figure 1. Sample Area 1 
 
















6% H2S, 16% C2 to 
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6% H2S, 2% H2, 9% 
C1 to C4, 2% C5 to 
C6, 81% C7+ 




12% C3 to C4, 27% 




2% H2S, 1% CO, 
1% SO2, 2% H2, 
40% H2O, 54% N2 




5% H2S, 71.5% C1 
to C4, 23% C7+, 
0.5% NH3 
Y Y Y 
C-100 Column 1 
48% H2, 52% C1 to 
C4  Y Y N 
Note:  
# Components with molar fraction ≥ 1% for hydrocarbon, or concentration ≥ IDLH value for toxic gas (i.e. 100 ppm 
for H2S, 300 ppm for NH3, etc.) are listed for reference. 
 
 
What types of detectors are required? 
 
Following the requirements for detection, the type of detectors required also need to be 
determined. While undertaking this exercise based on the process stream composition, some 
refinement can be applied to this step using engineering judgement. For example, if a process 
stream handled by any equipment comprises both flammable and toxic materials, would both types 
of detectors be required? Provision of only one type of detector (flammable or toxic) may be 
sufficient, depending on whichever will alarm first considering dilution to the desired set point 
after a release, while taking cross credit for detecting the secondary hazard. A similar consideration 
may also be adopted when a process stream contains more than one toxic material (e.g. H2S, NH3, 
CO, etc.). In this case, dilution calculations must be performed using the process stream 
composition and individual detection set points to verify which type of detection will provide an 
earlier alarm. However, the authors would like to point out that care must be taken to ensure that 
these cross credit considerations are applicable to all operating modes and all streams handled by 
the equipment. Separate detection may otherwise be required. There is also a lack of clear 
guidelines for determining the type of detection and threshold to be considered when the process 
stream contains both H2 and hydrocarbons. This is an area that warrants further in-depth 
assessment to provide clear guidance that can be uniformly implemented in the industry. 
 
Table 2 revisits the requirements for detection for the Sample Area 1 with the application of 
the principles of cross credit. It is again stressed that such cross credit consideration can only be 
applied to equipment which handle streams containing both types of materials (e.g. flammable and 
toxic) and at all operating modes. Individual types of detection may still be required for other 
equipment with streams which only pose one of the two hazards. 
 
















6% H2S, 16% C2 to 
C4, 17% C5 to C6, 
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6% H2S, 2% H2, 9% 
C1 to C4, 2% C5 to 
C6, 81% C7+ 




12% C3 to C4, 27% 
C5 to C6, 61% C7+ 




2% H2S, 1% CO, 
1% SO2, 2% H2, 
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5% H2S, 71.5% C1 
to C4, 23% C7+, 
0.5% NH3 
Y (HC) * Y (H2S)
++ 
C-100 Column 1 
48% H2, 52% C1 to 
C4  
Y (HC) Y (HC) N 
Note: 
# Components with molar fraction ≥ 1% for hydrocarbon, or concentration ≥ IDLH value for toxic gas (i.e. 100 ppm 
for H2S, 300 ppm for NH3, etc.) are listed for reference. 
* Flammable gas detection is inferred by toxic (H2S) gas detectors. Based on stream composition, toxic (H2S) gas 
detectors will alarm first considering the alarm set point and dilution factor. 
‡ Toxic gas detection is inferred by flammable gas detectors. Based on stream composition, flammable gas detectors 
will alarm first considering the alarm set point and dilution factor. 
^ CO is inferred by toxic (H2S) gas detectors. Based on stream composition, toxic (H2S) gas detectors will alarm first 
considering the alarm set point and dilution factor. 
++ NH3 is inferred by toxic (H2S) gas detectors. Based on stream composition, toxic (H2S) gas detectors will alarm 
first considering the alarm set point and dilution factor. 
 
Current Industry Practices / Conventional Approaches 
 
Traditional rule-of-thumb approaches for locating fire and gas detectors are typically based 
on 2D equipment layouts and are mainly developed using operational experience, engineering 
judgement and based on past practices adopted by the respective facilities. Direct implementation 
of these approaches often lead to too many detectors and / or inadequate coverage. Too many 
detectors result in increased capital expenditure and maintenance costs, while fewer than required 
detectors lead to less coverage. The traditional 2D approaches may also not accurately account for 
and/or benefit from the detector parameters (sensitivity, range / target gas cloud size, etc.). 
Additionally, a 2D assessment may also not be sufficient to adequately capture considerations 
related to voting logic for both fire & gas detection, cross deck / cross elevation coverage for gas 
detection, combination of point type and open path type gas detectors, etc. Furthermore, a 2D 
assessment can also lead to issues during installation and commissioning phase especially for 
flame detectors since it is difficult to provide appropriate elevation and view angle or minimize 
line of sight obstructions for flame detectors without taking into account the actual physical 
environment. 
 
A 3D Fire & Gas Mapping software tool provides a way forward that can address these 
concerns. There is a trend in the industry to move towards using a 3D fire & gas mapping software 
tool to optimize the number and location of fire and gas detectors. A detailed discussion on the 
benefits of using a 3D tool and the requirements set forth for such 3D tools to deliver on their 
potential is provided later in this paper. The following subsections provide a brief comparison of 




A “target based approach” is perhaps the most common approach adopted for determining 
the location of flame detectors. Individual sets of flame detectors (or a single flame detector 
depending on philosophy) are provided for each set of equipment requiring flame detection. This 
approach may lead to a high number of detectors since the analysis does not take credit of the 
detector sensitivity and range considering the target fire size. Furthermore, using only a 2D 
equipment layout to place detectors at opposite ends (refer to Figure 2) may not be sufficient. 
Without considering the actual physical environment in the area of concern, it is not possible to 
ascertain whether the flame detectors have a clear line of sight to the target or in other cases that 
the clear line of sight is maximized. Also, it may not be possible to accurately determine whether 
the required coverage target has been achieved especially where detector voting exceeds 1ooN. 
 
Typically, for fire detection, a similar target fire size is selected for the entire facility 
(although it is important to note that given the higher risk and asset loss potential, offshore facilities 
generally tend to use a smaller target fire size as compared to onshore facilities). Hence, a 3D fire 
mapping software tool which considers the target fire size, flame detector sensitivity, range, field 
of view (from datasheet) and other associated parameters can allow for optimizing the number and 
location of flame detectors for groups of equipment located in the same area, while ensuring the 
coverage target is also achieved considering the required voting logic (1ooN, 2ooN, etc.). There 
are however a number of additional aspects including fire grading (area to be protected), detector 
yee and yaw angles, etc. which need to be defined in a three dimensional analysis. 
 
A brief comparison of the number of flame detectors and coverage achieved considering the 
target based approach and optimization using IRESC’s proprietary in-house 3D Fire & Gas 
Mapping software tool is provided in Figure 2. As seen from the figure, a three dimensional 
analysis can help optimize number of detectors and ensure coverage target is achieved while 
capturing different voting logics. It also demonstrates that the performance target can be achieved 
with optimized detector locations (and fewer detectors for this case) without compromising safety. 
 
Target based approach Optimized using IRESC’s 3D mapping tool 
  
No. of Detectors 6 No. of Detectors 5 
0ooN 34.5 1ooN 31.1 2ooN 34.4 0ooN 0.2 1ooN 17.6 2ooN 82.2 
Note: Detector range assumed to be 40 m which is typical for onshore facilities. 




“Leak source based approach” is the most common approach adopted for locating gas 
detectors in the authors’ experience. In this approach, point type gas detectors are placed close to 
the leak sources identified which may include pump seals, flanges, valves, etc. Since the selection 
of likely leak sources is based on experience and engineering judgement, there is a wide variation 
in the identification of potential leak sources. The authors have seen projects where only rotating 
equipment seals are considered as a leak source while others consider all flanges, valves, etc. as 
leak sources. Gas leaks at valve manifolds or clusters of status equipment, if left undetected, may 
also accumulate and result in an explosion. The above differences in consideration results in high 
variation in the number of detectors provided for similar facilities.  
 
Another approach, namely the “grid / spacing based approach” is a prescriptive form of 
locating gas detectors. Gas detectors are located at a fixed spacing / fixed distance (representing 
the target gas cloud size) based on prescriptive guidelines. The typical spacing used in this 
approach is 10 m for an open area corresponding to onshore facilities. Offshore facilities lie either 
in the open domain or a partially enclosed domain (spacing for partially enclosed volumes is 
between 5 to 7 m). The actual spacing adopted may vary with operator, but typically the upper 
bound in this approach is about 10 m. For toxic gas detection, this approach intends to provide 
general area coverage to alert operators and limit migration. In this approach, the detector locations 
are entirely based on even distribution across the area of concern without taking into account leak 
source locations, prevailing wind direction or impact of physical environment on the footprint of 
the gas clouds. This approach is on the conservative side and likely to result in a large number of 
detectors, which may not necessarily improve the probability of successful detection but will 
definitely increase the likelihood of spurious trips and life cycle maintenance costs. Also, this 
approach tends to provide detection at grade level and thereby leak sources at higher elevations 
such as valve manifolds, elevated platforms, column top connections, etc. may go unprotected, 
unless the same approach is adopted at higher elevation as well. 
 
A “congestion/consequence based approach” is proposed in guidelines developed by some 
operating companies where flammable gas detectors are placed considering the potential for 
explosion to occur (i.e. inside congested areas where leak sources are located). In this approach, 
the typical target gas cloud size lies in the range of 5 m to 10 m diameter depending on the area 
characteristics (level of congestion, confinement, fuel, etc.). Since the direct application of default 
target gas cloud size may be conservative, the guidelines allow for further refinement of cloud size 
using either dispersion and/or explosion modelling (a damaging overpressure threshold of 150 
mbar is typically adopted [5]). This is an important step to keep the assessment practical. The 
selected cloud size can then be used to determine the coverage achieved using specialized 3D 
software tools, also taking into account detector voting logic etc. This is a consequence based 
assessment where the selected gas clouds are modelled as idealised spheres. In this approach, 
usually dispersion modelling is also conducted for determining the cloud size for toxic gas 
detection. This approach is suitable for congested areas in onshore or typical offshore facilities. 
However, for open areas, a direct implementation may result in excessive detectors. In this regard, 
the authors have also discussed a “Minimum Requirements Approach” in another paper [6] which 
uses a combination of congestion based and leak source based approaches to arrive at a practical 
number of detectors without compromising safety. 
 
There are also some less common approaches such as the “likely accumulation approach” 
which places detector in the area where accumulation of gas cloud is likely. This approach is 
intended to utilize the density difference between process fluids and ambient air. So for dense 
gases, they are assumed to sink and location of detectors will therefore be limited to grade level 
while buoyant gases are assumed to accumulate under a roof where detectors may be located. 
However, pressurized releases will tend to mix rapidly with air to form flammable mixtures whose 
location is not limited by elevation and these mixtures can get ignited resulting in an explosion. 
Such considerations are not accounted for in this approach.  
 
Other approaches such as “dispersion based approach” utilize CFD dispersion simulations 
to optimize gas detector locations based on rate of successful detection and the time required for 
detection. This approach is discussed further in later sections of this paper. 
 
A brief comparison of the coverage achieved considering the various approaches discussed 
above is provided in Figure 3. The geographical coverage provided by different detector layouts 
was assessed using IRESC’s proprietary in-house 3D Fire & Gas mapping software tool.  
 
(a) Leak Source Based (b) Grid Based 
  
No. of Detectors 12 No. of Detectors 12 
0ooN 0.4 1ooN 17.2 0ooN 5.9 1ooN 25.8 
2ooN 39.4 ≥3ooN 43.0 2ooN 56.9 ≥3ooN 11.4 
(c) Consequence Based (b) Minimum Requirements Based 
  
No. of Detectors 4 No. of Detectors 10 
0ooN 4.2 1ooN 31.5 0ooN 1.5 1ooN 18.4 
2ooN 36.4 ≥3ooN 27.9 2ooN 43.1 ≥3ooN 37.0 
Note: Target Cloud Size: 15 m 
Figure 3: Volumetric Coverage of Typical Conventional Approaches and 3D F&G Mapping 
Use of 3D Mapping for Optimization of F&G Detector Layout 
As described in earlier sections, direct application of rule-of-thumb approaches to locating 
detectors and inconsistencies in the identification of hazardous areas nature of hazards and/or 
equipment covered for detection leads to either too many detectors and/or inadequate coverage. 
The further refinement of these practices coupled with a fully three dimensional assessment is 
definitely the way forward for the assessment of FGS performance. 3D mapping software tools 
will allow for quantitative optimization of fire and gas detection coverage taking into account the 
actual physical environment and the detector parameters. It presents the user with a clear picture 
to locate detectors in more practical, easy to access locations without compromising coverage or 
safety. It is not desirable to find out during installation at site that a proposed detector location is 
impractical. Hence, it is important that the right 3D model at the right stage is used as it forms the 
core of the assessment. A 3D fire & gas mapping software tool can be customized to predict the 
coverage achieved using the same detector configuration for different voting logics and also 
providing information on contribution to overall coverage from individual detectors. In general, 
the 3D tools enable designers to assess at what point and with how many detectors is a practical 
limit reached, after which the provision of additional detectors does not justify their cost. 
 
Noting all the above considerations, to some extent, it is safe to say that such 3D tools 
coupled with some refinement in hazard identification can help achieve a balance between safety, 
cost and reliability. The authors would also like to highlight some finer aspects of 3D mapping as 
discussed below. 
 
3D Flame Detection 
 
3D tools for flame mapping enable the visualization of actual obstructions by equipment, 
structures and piping to the flame detector line-of-sight which cannot be accounted in a 2D 
assessment. These obstructions are typically accounted for in a 3D coverage calculation. With 
optimization in a 3D environment, flame detection coverage can be improved significantly by 
placing detectors at locations with optimal view angles. A 3D assessment also enables to ascertain 
with confidence the elevation and yee and yaw angles to be used for individual flame detectors, 
which are parameters left for the team at site to decide in a 2D assessment. The parameters used 
for the assessment also tend to differ based on project philosophy, type of facility and the 
specifications. A 3D tool with customizable input parameters provides the right amount of 
flexibility to allow users to define detection range, target fire size, horizontal & vertical Field Of 
View (FOV) based on detector datasheet and project specifications. A sample comparison is 
provided in Figure 4. As shown in this figure, what seems as an appropriate location for flame 
detector based on a 2D assessment results in an obstructed line of sight and poor coverage. With 
3D optimization, the coverage is improved significantly with the same detector. Other aspects such 
as solid angle corrections can also be accounted for. 
 
2D Detector Placement 
Layout Detector View Coverage 
 
  
No. of Detectors: 1 0ooN 83.3 1ooN 16.7 
3D Detector Optimization 
Layout Detector View Coverage 
   
No. of Detectors: 1 0ooN 51.1 1ooN 48.9 
Note: Detector range assumed to be 40 m which is typical for onshore facilities. 
Figure 4: Flame Detection - 2D vs 3D 
 
3D Gas Detection 
 
Similar to fire detection, 3D tools provide benefits for gas detection as well. The open path 
detectors are based on clear line of sight between source and transmitter (also referenced as 
receiver) and hence, a 3D assessment using open path gas detectors shares some of the benefits as 
those already discussed for flame detection. Additionally, a 3D tool for gas detection can provide 
accurate coverage calculations for a selected volume considering the desired target gas cloud size 
and voting logic. Factors such as cross credit between different types of gas detectors can also be 
accounted for in the calculations. 
 
Gas detectors are mainly two types i.e. point type detectors and open path type detectors. 3D 
mapping tools can help optimize gas detection coverage using only point type detectors, open path 
type detectors or a combination of both. It is not easy to predict whether the required coverage 
target has been achieved, especially when using a combination of the two types of gas detectors 
without the support from a robust 3D mapping tool. For large units and/or complex areas, the use 
of only point type detectors may result in a large number of detectors, which also increases the 
overall life cycle cost. For such scenarios, using a combination of detectors may be beneficial 
which can be effectively evaluated using 3D mapping tools. A comparison of these options is 












Point type detectors Open path detectors Combination of Both 
    
No. of Detectors 12 No. of Detectors 2 No. of Detectors 6 
0ooN 0.4 1ooN 17.2 0ooN 4.6 1ooN 71.3 0ooN 2.8 1ooN 16.1 
2ooN 39.4 >3ooN 43.0 2ooN 24.1 >3ooN 0.0 2ooN 51.3 >3ooN 29.8 
Note: Target Cloud Size selected was 15 m 
Figure 5 - Comparison between considering different type of gas detectors 
 
For complex congested modules located in onshore facilities or offshore in FPSOs/FLNGs 
or multiple congested decks in an offshore platform, gas clouds can migrate through the decks 
(assuming they are grated and not plated) and accumulation may occur across the entire module / 
entire platform. Gas detectors may be placed at various elevations in the module / across multiple 
decks. A 2D assessment cannot capture this feature accurately and it may result in a high number 
of detectors since the benefit of cross deck / cross elevation contribution remains unutilized. The 
authors would however, advise caution when considering cross deck contributions since this 
consideration is also dependent on the density of process fluids. For instance, detectors at the 
uppermost deck should not be considered to detect heavy gases that will accumulate close to the 
grade level.  
 
Figure 6 shows a sample modular area (denoted as Sample Area 2) developed for this 
purpose. Figure 7 below demonstrates the difference in detection coverage between assessment 
with and without taking credit for cross-deck coverage. The coverage by 2 or more detectors 





Figure 6: Sample Area 2: Modular Structure 
 













No. of Detectors 13 No. of Detectors 13 
0ooN 5.8 1ooN 34.9 0ooN 6.7 1ooN 13.3 
2ooN 51.0 >3ooN 8.3 2ooN 50.3 >3ooN 29.7 
Note: Target Cloud Size selected was 15 m 






In addition to achieving the target geographical coverage, the FGS performance also depends 
on the reliability of detectors. For example, if a 1ooN coverage of 90% is achieved by providing a 
detector whose reliability is 90%, this means that the actual detection probability is only 81%. The 
detection probability will drop further to 73% in case a 2ooN voting logic is adopted [6]. Detectors 
may be unavailable due to failures or periodic maintenance activities leading to inadequate 
coverage. This effect is magnified for facilities that adopt 1ooN voting logic (i.e. coverage by a 
single detector) where a number of areas may only be provided with a single detector. One way to 
overcome this issue is to consider “N = M+1” when considering a voting logic of MooN (M out 
of N detectors). Simply put, this means that a minimum number of detectors required for an area 
adopting a 1ooN voting logic would be 2. Similarly, for a 2ooN voting logic, the minimum number 
of detectors would be 3 and so on. This approach would ensure the coverage target is achieved 
even if one of the detectors is not available. The investment and life cycle cost of additional 
detectors increases, but has to be evaluated based on a cost-benefit analysis 
 
Applications of CFD Modelling in 3D Fire and Gas Mapping 
 
As discussed earlier in this paper, the typical target cloud sizes suggested by guidelines from 
some operating companies are refined further using explosion modelling. For this purpose, CFD 
based explosion modelling can be performed to determine the target cloud size required to limit 
the explosion overpressure to below 150 mbar [5], which is the threshold for damage to structures/ 
equipment. The simulations can be conducted for a range of process stream compositions as 
applicable to the facility and also considering different levels of congestion depending on the 
characteristics of the areas where they are handled. A “dispersion based approach” using CFD 
simulations may also be adopted for determining the probability for successful detection for a 
given detector layout. Flammable gas clouds are never perfect spheres, especially those produced 
from high pressure momentum releases. For example, a narrow elliptical gas cloud may slip 
through and remain undetected. Since typical consequence modelling software using Gaussian 
dispersion model do not account for the effect of obstructions in gas dispersion, this results in 
inaccurate prediction of gas cloud shape, especially in the near-field area. This is where CFD 
dispersion simulations can help in predicting a more realistic dispersion footprint of flammable 
gas cloud and thereby, a more realistic detection success probability. Furthermore, CFD based 
dispersion simulations can also enable prediction of the time required for detection of different 
leak scenarios. The detector layout can then be optimized to meet the assumptions used in the risk 
assessments to minimize the potential for escalation. 
 
Although more accurate, CFD techniques are resource and time intensive. Typically, due to 
these limitations and to maintain a practical timeframe for the assessment, only a limited number 
of leak scenarios are considered. Furthermore, the selection of leak scenarios is based on 
experience and engineering judgement only. Hence, it may not be sufficient to use the results from 
only a limited number of scenarios to decide the detector layout for the entire facility. This is an 
area which needs further work in order to determine an effective way to combine the assessment 




This paper has examined various aspects of fire and gas detection, identifying the gaps and 
inconsistencies that exist in detector layout development using current practices which are based 
on operational experience, engineering judgement and conventional approaches. The paper has 
emphasized the necessity to correctly determine the requirements for detection at an equipment 
level before developing the detector layout such that the the safety of the facility is not 
compromised. Using case studies, the paper has demonstrated the benefits of adopting a 3D 
assessment for verifying fire and gas detector coverage using appropriate software tools. CFD 
based modelling tools can also help in optimizing detector performance. 
 
Through this paper, the authors aim to promote further discussion amongst designers and 
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